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Introduction
The region of former Yugoslavia has 
experienced a series of violent ethnici-
ty-based conflicts throughout the 1990s 
when dominant republican majority 
groups (Slovenes, Croats, Bosniaks, 
Kosovo Albanians) wrested control 
over 'their' republic from Serbs. Scho-
lars have long studied the ethno-politi-
cal mobilisation and violence by Serbs, 
Croats, Bosniaks, and Kosovo Albanians 
and analysed their impact on state bu-
ilding, minority accommodation and 
the establishment of the rule of law after 
the conflict. Far less attention, however, 
has been granted to minor groups, those 
who were affected by the conflict but did 
not play a central role in its resolution. 
These minority groups often participa-
ted in politics from the margins but con-
tributed to peace and state building.
Reasons for political participation 
vary greatly, but social and economic 
motives set the context in which con-
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temporary relationships between the 
political interactions of members of 
formerly conflicting groups have been 
formed. Crises and violent conflict in 
particular support the emergence of 
new ethno-political identities. Thus, in 
societies emerging from violent confli-
cts, ethnic identities hold a particular 
degree of significance and continue to 
galvanise electorates to ensure represen-
tation of the 'likes by the likes' (Wimmer 
1997). Comparative research on confli-
ct has focussed to some extent on the 
effects of conflict on multidimensional 
identity transformation during and after 
violence (Kalyvas 2008; Wood 2015). 
However, the primary focus of research 
has been on the radicalisation of iden-
tities in the conflicting parties (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003) and the underlying 
relationship between identities and cau-
sal effects on their change in conflict 
(Gurr 1994), or the process of identity 
transformation within the conflicting 
parties (Wilhelmsen 2005). Others po-
int out that the effect of political insti-
tutions privileging certain group identi-
ties in access to state resources, as well 
as offering individual opportunities for 
social advancement, is far more impor-
tant for increasing the salience of ethnic 
identities (McLaughlin 2007). Instituti-
onal incentives, thus, trump individual 
identity preferences.
We focus specifically on Croatia, whe-
re conflict took place in several regi-
ons with high levels of ethnic diversity, 
including Hungarians, Roma, Czechs, 
Ruthenians, Slovaks and many others. 
Following Juon (2020), we focus on mi-
nority groups with the size of 'less than 
half the one of the next larger minority 
group of the groups whose size is below 
10% of a country's population'. This 
allows us to reflect the context of the co-
untry and to make it clear that although 
the Serbs are the largest minority (popu-
lation share of 4.36%), all other groups 
account for less than 1% of the entire 
population (Krasniqi 2015).1 The focus 
of our study is all ethnic groups, except 
for Serbs, present in the former conflict 
zones, contested territories and/or dire-
ctly affected by the violence between the 
dominant Croats and Serbs.
We proceed in three steps; first we 
present a brief outline of the 'nationali-
sation' process in Croatia by setting the 
context in which contemporary politics 
takes place. We then discuss the electo-
ral dynamics at the municipal level whe-
re it is clear that ethnic politicking takes 
the upper hand over politicking on civic 
issues, despite the (presumed, shared) 
interest of all citizens in the best possible 
policy outcomes. Finally, we draw upon 
the sets of our qualitative interviews 
conducted over the past five years with 
representatives of non-dominant groups 
that illustrate data offered by our des-
criptive statistics.2
Ethnopolitical Mobilisation 
in Croatia
Since the mid-1960s, for the ethno-po-
litically mobilised Croats, national so-
vereignty, and ultimately nation-state 
independence, crystallised as the focal 
point of political mobilisation that es-
calated with the break-up of Yugosla-
via in early 1990s. However, the Serbs, 
who until 1991 constituted about 12% of 
the republic's population, opposed the 
independence of the Croat nation-sta-
te setting the two groups on course for 
interethnic violence. The war in Cro-
atia (1991-1995) directly affected ma-
1 Popis stanovništva, kućanstava i stanova 
2011. godine.
2 We have conducted considerable desk-ba-
sed and field research, collating the muni-
cipal-level electoral data from eleven ele-
ctions for the period of 2003-2017 and 
triangulating it with the qualitative data 
collected in more than 20 interviews, all of 
which underlie the present study.
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inly the areas claimed and temporarily 
controlled by the rebel Serb structures, 
comprising about 30% of the Croatian 
territory. Hundreds of thousands had 
to leave their homes as a result of ethnic 
expulsions committed by both warring 
parties. The vast majority of Serbs fled 
the Serbs-controlled areas of Krajina 
and Western Slavonia as a result of Cro-
atian military offensive in 1995, and 
just half of the pre-war Serb population 
remained in Eastern Slavonia, the area 
temporarily taken out of control of the 
central institutions by the international 
transitional administration after the vio-
lent conflict (Živić and Pokos 2004).
During the conflict, areas settled by 
non-dominant groups were subject to 
territorial claims both by the Serbs and 
the Croats. All non-dominant commu-
nities had to take sides in the conflict 
or remain neutral (Perić Kaselj, Ški-
ljan, and Vukić 2015; Cocozzelli 2008); 
they faced a social environment marred 
by inter-ethnic tensions and a general 
atmosphere of intolerance towards eth-
nic 'others' during and after the conflict 
(Trifunovska 1998). Some groups, such 
as particular local communities of the 
Slovaks and the Roma, remained neutral 
throughout the conflict, while others, 
including the Hungarian or the Czech 
community, openly supported one of 
the conflict parties (Szabolcs 2012; Pe-
rić Kaselj, Škiljan, and Vukić 2015; Pap 
2015; Rygolová 2016). Many smaller lo-
cal groups, such as the Ruthenians and 
the Hungarians in Eastern Slavonia, 
largely fled, only to partially return af-
ter the end of the war (Klemenčič and 
Zupančič 2004; Kocsis and Kocsis-Ho-
dosi 1998). Furthermore, minority gro-
ups were frequently internally divided 
over their political position towards the 
Croatian-Serb conflict as well as in the-
ir decisions whether to stay or flee the 
warzone, which led to further intra-gro-
up splits among them (Škiljan 2013). 
Similar to the case of the Turks settled 
in Southern Kosovo, non-dominant mi-
norities have been 'squeezed not only 
between the conflicting majority natio-
nalism… and the larger minority nati-
onalism…, but also between their own 
ethnic, religious and civic identities' 
(Kut 2000, 1).
The final political settlements of the 
conflict ultimately granted the minority 
groups some, albeit weak, special status. 
Beyond elementary citizen rights, all 
minorities were granted the right to re-
turn to their pre-war places of residence 
and minority political representation at 
different institutional levels was institu-
tionally guaranteed (Caspersen 2008). 
Serbs in Eastern Croatia were allowed 
to form a special quasi-territorial entity 
in the form of an association of munici-
palities intended to consolidate their et-
hno-territorial autonomy (Barić 2011). 
Despite the end of hostilities and the 
partial political settlement, ethnic con-
flict between the majority Croats and 
the Serb minority has remained present 
in municipal politics well until the pre-
sent day and political, economic and 
societal interactions between the Croats 
and the Serbs remain limited (Čermák 
2017; Jelić, Čorkalo Biruški, and Ajdu-
ković 2013; Gregurović 2014).
In the post-conflict period, smaller 
communities again disappeared in a 
shadow of the dominant groups' com-
petition. For example, tiny Italian com-
munities in Western Slavonia residing 
in the area affected by conflict are rarely 
mentioned in the media, whereas most 
Italians settling in Istria – not affected by 
violence – frequently feature in Italian 
and Croatian reports. Similarly, Hun-
garians that have been the dominant 
group in large parts of Eastern Croatia, 
and Czechs in rural areas of Central 
Croatia are held up as examples of inte-
gration into Croatian politics. However, 
the political appearance of smaller com-
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munities of Ruthenians and Slovaks that 
have been present in Eastern and Cen-
tral Croatia, as well as Bosniaks living in 
central Croatia and have co-resided with 
both dominant Serbs and Croats for de-
cades, are rarely granted any attention. 
All these communities have long been 
participating in municipal, local, and 
national politics at various stages of 
Croatian statehood, but were neglected 
in the conflict settlement.
This omission is also reflected in the 
scant attention granted to non-domi-
nant groups in post-conflict Yugoslavia. 
As in post-conflict Croatia, Kosovo's 
Bosniaks, Gorani, Turks, Roma and Bo-
snia and Herzegovina's Roma and Jews, 
and post-Ohrid Macedonia's Roma and 
Turks have been the focus of research in 
political participation as autochthonous, 
historically resident minority populati-
ons of these states, but less so as citizens 
endowed with equal political rights to 
the majority.
The focus on national-level politi-
cs might be justified because Croatia, 
alongside all other post-Yugoslav states, 
is a nation-state of its dominant ethnic 
group. The Preamble of the Croatian 
Constitution states that 'the Republic of 
Croatia is established as the nation state 
of the Croatian people and the state of 
the members of autochthonous national 
minorities'. The national statehood was 
designed – at least in part – as a respon-
se to the national majority's experiences 
with statehood aspirations, interethnic 
competition in Yugoslavia, and later, 
ethnicity-based violence during the 
1990s. Following the end of conflict, 
ethnic communities went through the 
process of consolidating their ranks in 
the view of ethnic polarization of Cro-
atia's society (Zlodi 2005; Peternel and 
Škiljan 2017; Božić 2010). Additionally, 
the first years of independence saw the 
nation-centred HDZ tutelage in politics 
that fostered the ideal of the Croat nati-
onal state with but token concessions to 
non-Croat citizens (HRW 1999).
Electoral Rules and 
Minority Representation
It was not until the early 2000s that 
Croatia's prospective accession to both 
NATO and the EU sparked internatio-
nal attention to the rights of minority 
groups other than the Serbs. When the 
new Social Democratic Party of Croatia 
(SDP) took the power from the Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ) in 2000, they 
put into place a set of minority policies 
to ensure the start of the EU accession 
negotiations. Today, Croatia boasts the 
complex guaranteed representation of 
non-dominant groups' interests in the 
formal political process.
The Constitutional Law on the Rights 
of National Minorities (2002) was the 
centrepiece of the EU-accession-related 
law-making flurry. It explicitly grants 
special individual and group rights to 
all citizens who identify themselves as 
members of ethnically, linguistically, cul-
turally or religiously defined traditional 
minorities.3 Hence, all Croatian citizens 
have the individual right to identify in 
ethnic terms. This right has been a pre-
cursor to exclusive rights for the politi-
cal representation of all ethnic minori-
ties at all levels of political institutions: 
all minority citizens can now directly 
elect their exclusive representatives to 
municipal, regional and state-level in-
stitutions based solely on the individu-
al declaration of ethnic identity. As was 
the case of other accession countries, 'as 
long as Croatia was in the process of EU 
accession, minority policies were deve-
loped under the EU pressure. But now, 
as Croatia has become a full EU mem-
ber, there is no need to work with mino-
rities. Minority policy looks great on pa-
per; it is a different story in practice. In 
3 Ustavni zakon o pravima nacionalnih 
manjina, Art. 5.
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principle, (minorities) have everything, 
but there is no budget for anything.'4
This suggests that electoral politics 
are focal points for assessing the politi-
cal mobilisation of ethnic issues. In this 
regard, we should see the electoral rules 
in place as an effect of political aspirati-
on of the state-building nation, offering 
opportunities and challenges for voters, 
candidates and nominating groups to 
strategise in accomplishing their (eth-
no)political agendas (Birch 2003: 17). 
Electoral rules therefore are mechani-
sms for establishing the accountability 
of the elected to those electing based 
on past performance, while at the same 
time they should be seen as avenues to 
extending (some) representation to di-
verse segments of the electorate (Herron 
2009: 3; Thomassen 2014).
Croatia's electoral system incentivi-
ses ethno-political mobilisation by en-
suring the exclusive representation of 
minorities by minorities. At state level, 
those registered as minority members 
ought to choose between voting for 'ci-
vic' units, i.e. regular electoral lists, or 
'ethnic' units, i.e. using their exclusive 
right to elect representatives from the 
designated ethnic electoral list. At regi-
onal and municipal level, for elections 
to executive bodies, minority voters can 
use the double suffrage right and cast 
their ballot for a regular and/or a mino-
rity candidate. Furthermore, minority 
members can express their preference 
by casting an ethnic vote in the special 
elections for national minority councils, 
which are minorities' dedicated advi-
sory bodies. Beyond the structure of 
guaranteed seats, minorities can also set 
their own 'ethnic' candidate lists in the 
regular proportional elections for the 
legislative bodies at all levels, as well as 
negotiate the inclusion of their candida-
4 Interview with an Advisor to the Minority 
Deputy in Croatian Parliament, Zagreb, 27 
June 2018.
tes on civic parties' lists in exchange for 
support during the electoral cycle.
At the level of the state legislature, 
national minorities are allocated a to-
tal of eight (out of 140) reserved seats 
in the otherwise proportionally-elected 
Parliament (Sabor). The number of se-
ats reserved for a single community 
generally reflects its demographic we-
ight: the largest community of Serbs has 
three reserved seats, large Italian and 
Hungarian minorities have one each, 
relatively numerous Czechs share one 
seat with a tiny Slovak community, and 
an additional two seats are reserved for 
smaller autochthonous and the 'new' 
post-Yugoslav minorities.5 Hence, each 
eligible minority voter has to choose ei-
ther to cast a 'civic' or an 'ethnic' vote 
for their representative in the state-le-
vel legislature. All citizens who declare 
themselves as members of these mino-
rities have the right to decide if they will 
cast their ballot within the ethnically 
exclusive state-level minority electoral 
unit, or if they will vote in the regular 
proportional electoral district, which is 
organized regionally.
At the level of regional and municipal 
self-government, provisions for minori-
ty representation are more fine-grained. 
Depending on their demographic we-
ight in the overall population, minority 
citizens can directly elect 'their ethnic' 
representatives into executive, legislative 
and advisory bodies at both institutional 
5 Members of the so-called old minorities 
(Austrian, Bulgarian, German, Polish, 
Roma, Romanian, Ruthenian, Russian, 
Turkish, Ukrainian, Vallachian and Jewish) 
together elect one representative to Parlia-
ment, and members of the 'new minorities' 
(Albanian, Bosniak, Montenegrin, Mace-
donian and Slovenian national minori-
ties) equally elect one joint representative 
(Act on Election of Representatives to the 
Croatian Parliament, Art 16; http://www.
sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=16930 Accessed 
2018/11/01).
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levels. In elections of regional and muni-
cipal executive members, in contrast to 
the state level, minorities are granted the 
so-called 'double suffrage' in exclusive-
ly ethnic minority run-off elections: All 
voters registered as minority members 
can vote both for the regular mayor/pre-
fect as well as for their minority deputy. 
Minorities are granted their directly-ele-
cted deputy prefect in the regional exe-
cutives of counties with 5% or more 
minority residents, and deputy mayor 
in the municipal executives of muni-
cipalities with 15% or more minority 
residents. Moreover, since 2013, mino-
rities are additionally granted reserved 
seats in municipal legislatures with 5% 
of minority voters; once their proporti-
on in the demographics reaches the 15% 
threshold locally, or 5% regionally, mi-
norities are represented proportionally 
according to their demographic share by 
means of a proportional electoral mec-
hanism (i.e. vote for a 'non-ethnic' list of 
candidates).6
To ascertain whether voters strategi-
cally use their 'ethnic' voice, we focus 
on non-dominant ethnic minorities' 
political participation in municipal, re-
gional and national elections.7 Due to 
the localized character of minorities' 
presence, we conduct our analysis at the 
6 There is an additional guarantee to make 
minorities' voices heard in regional and 
municipal legislatures for cases when the 
granted seat is not filled or the propor-
tionality is not reached: the number of 
councillors is then extended to co-opt the 
highest-ranking minority candidate from 
the successful parties, Ustavni zakon o pra-
vima nacionalnih manjina, Art. 20, see also 
(Jakešević, Tatalović, and Lacović 2015)
7 While some of the non-dominant mino-
rities covered by the research are concen-
trated mainly within the former conflict 
zones (Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Rut-
henians), this distinction is important for 
Bosniaks and Roma who settle in larger 
numbers also in other parts of Croatia that 
were less affected by the previous conflict.
level of municipalities. Croatia's muni-
cipalities serve as the primary admini-
strative units, and they are also the main 
municipal socio-political and self-go-
vernment administrations, as well as 
the basic electoral units. The municipal 
level is appropriate for the analysis of 
the political choices made by non-do-
minant groups because non-dominant 
communities account for a non-negligi-
ble share of total populations, but often 
form a plurality in the electorate. In all 
post-conflict municipalities, we have 
identified the relevant non-dominant 
ethnic groups based on the 2011 muni-
cipal population census data. We have 
only included those municipal minority 
communities that fulfil the demograp-
hic criteria to be granted ethnically exc-
lusive political rights.
Altogether, we have identified 27 mu-
nicipalities as relevant electoral battle-
grounds in the post-conflict areas of 
Croatia where six different non-domi-
nant groups compete (Bosniaks, Czechs, 
Hungarians, Ruthenians, Roma, Slo-
vaks). While Hungarians, Czechs and 
Bosniaks populate larger areas consi-
sting of several adjacent municipalities, 
other ethnic groups are present in only 
a few isolated municipalities. The relati-
ve share of all these groups in municipal 
populations ranges from 5% of Hunga-
rians in Erdut up to 47% of Czechs in 
Končanica and their absolute popula-
tion goes from just 141 Hungarians in 
the rural municipality Tompojevci to as 
much as 2,485 Czechs in the urban town 
of Daruvar. While most communities 
(23) live as a municipal minority to-
gether with the dominant majority (the 
Croats), three are settled in areas where 
the dominant minority (the Serbs) is in 
the position of municipal majority, and 
two communities are themselves in the 
position of municipal majority (the Cze-
chs in Končanica and the Hungarians in 
Kneževi Vinogradi).
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Non-Dominant Groups' 
Participation in Elections
As outlined above, every Croatian citi-
zen can self-declare as member of an et-
hnic community for electoral purposes 
with further political rights attached to 
this self-selected ethnic identity. Each 
citizen thus can cast a ballot following a 
choice of their primary identity as either 
a 'member of an ethnic community', or 
'only' as a Croat citizen. The perceptions 
Table 1. Non-dominant minorities in post-conflict areas of Croatia covered in this study
Minority Municipality Pop Pop %
Bosniaks
Gunja 1.108 30%
Drenovci 352 7%
Vojnić 318 7%
Cetingrad 314 15%
Czechs
Daruvar 2.485 21%
Končanica 1.110 47%
Grubišno Polje 1.109 17%
Dežanovac 627 23%
Sirač 251 11%
Hercegovac 196 8%
Hungarians
Kneževi Vinogradi 1.784 39%
Bilje 1.671 30%
Beli Manastir 801 8%
Draž 680 25%
Darda 482 7%
Ernestinovo 422 19%
Tordinci 371 18%
Erdut 370 5%
Petlovac 330 14%
Vladislavci 172 9%
Tompojevci 141 9%
Roma
Darda 650 9%
Jagodnjak 154 8%
Ruthenians
Bogdanovci 444 23%
Tompojevci 272 17%
Slovaks
Našice 1.078 7%
Ilok 935 14%
Punitovci 666 37%
Source: Official census data (2011)
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about the utility of ethnically self-iden-
tifying for political purposes would thus 
determine the levels of ethno-political 
mobilisation of that group at the ballot 
box. This, in turn, would enhance the 
visibility of ethnic minority political re-
presentatives in the elected government 
office.
Table 2. Levels of ethno-political identification and mobilisation for single groups 
across election types
Index of ethno-political identification
= share of voters registered as minority (on total voters registered) divided by minority 
share on population:
Election type year HU CZ SK RU RO BO 0
Parliament 0 80% 56% 51% 75% 69% 43% 62%
2003 79% 63% 51% 88% 36% 29% 58%
2007 73% 50% 38% 77% 48% 36% 54%
2011 76% 54% 56% 69% 64% 42% 60%
2015 83% 55% 56% 70% 98% 51% 69%
2016 90% 59% 56% 73% 96% 57% 72%
Local 0 102% 87% 82% 94% 55% 84%
2013 100% 86% 82% 94% 47% 82%
2017 103% 89% 83% 94% 64% 86%
Minority 0 95% 84% 81% 94% 60% 50% 77%
2003 100% 93% 80% 97% 33% 9% 69%
2007 91% 79% 79% 94% 52% 84% 80%
2011 91% 76% 80% 91% 62% 42% 74%
2015 98% 86% 85% 95% 95% 63% 87%
Index of ethno-political mobilisation 
= share of votes cast in minority electoral units (on total votes casted) divided bv minority 
share on population:
Election type year HU CZ SK RU RO BO 0
Parliament 0 85% 45% 33% 39% 61% 47% 52%
 2003 69% 57% 34% 67% 21% 36% 47%
 2007 73% 46% 16% 51% 35% 42% 44%
 2011 81% 51% 49% 36% 54% 56% 55%
 2015 88% 37% 35% 25% 111% 53% 58%
 2016 115% 35% 28% 18% 84% 50% 55%
Local 0 101% 73% 57% 94%  63% 78%
 2013 104% 72% 68% 99%  61% 81%
 2017 98% 75% 45% 90%  66% 75%
Minority 0 77% 18% 34% 42% 62% 34% 44%
 2003 65% 17% 50% 54% 9% 13% 35%
 2007 67% 17% 32% 40% 60% 50% 44%
 2011 80% 16% 26% 34% 57% 8% 37%
 2015 96% 20% 29% 38% 121% 64% 61%
Source: Authors' calculations based on the official census and electoral data
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We are primarily interested in three 
interrelated issues that will help us as-
sess the impact of incentive-driven et-
hno-political representation of non-do-
minant groups in divided societies. 
First, does the opportunity to elect eth-
nic representatives translate into higher 
preference for 'ethnic' voting in electi-
ons overall? Second, is there an obser-
vable difference in ethnic voting across 
different types of elections? Finally, do 
non-dominant ethnic communities di-
ffer in their participation in light of in-
stitutional incentives for ethno-political 
representation?
To assess the relationship between 
mobilisation and representation in 
non-dominant groups, we collected the 
available demographic data (minority 
headcounts in electoral registers and 
those who have effectively voted) and 
created two indexes to estimate the le-
vels of ethno-political identification and 
the level of ethno-political mobilisation 
in non-dominant groups. We constru-
cted the first index by taking the share 
of voters who identify as a minority on 
all registered electors divided by the po-
pulation share of the minority group in 
any given electoral district. The second 
is constructed analogously, but with the 
share of actual ethnic votes cast rather 
than the share of voters merely registe-
red as 'ethnic'. The index of ethno-po-
litical mobilisation indicates the share 
of minority groups who align their eth-
no-social identities with the ethno-poli-
tical choice, which does actively express 
its ethnic identity through voting. This 
allows us to assess whether the political 
mobilisation of non-dominant groups 
takes place exclusively along the ethnic 
lines, thus reflecting their overall sha-
re in the electorate. As members of the 
non-dominant groups registered par-
ticipate in elections, we do not expect 
them all to use their 'ethnic' vote and as 
such the higher correlation between the 
indexes would indicate higher ethnicisa-
tion of political participation.8
Our data suggests that the levels of 
ethno-political identification across 
the set of elections between 2003 and 
2017 are significantly higher for muni-
cipal elections (84%) and for minority 
elections (average 77% across groups) 
where voters can use their dual vote. 
In contrast, levels of ethno-political 
mobilisation in parliamentary electi-
ons where minorities have to choose 
between a 'civic' and an 'ethnic' vote is at 
62%, which is relatively modest. Howe-
ver, here the levels of ethno-political 
identification have been rising steadily 
since 2007, which reflects the growing 
entrenchment of nation-wide minority 
protection mechanisms (Glaurdić and 
Vuković 2015). Unsurprisingly, the dec-
lared identification with an ethnic group 
is generally significantly higher than the 
level of mobilisation across all types of 
elections (75% compared to 58%). The 
discrepancy between levels of identifica-
tion and mobilisation indicates that the-
re are large parts of all minorities who 
do identify with an ethnic electorate, yet 
they prefer casting their 'civic' vote, or 
absent from the elections.
As Table 2 shows, a large part of the 
minority population generally makes 
use of their 'ethnic' vote, yet as we ob-
serve that the instrumental use of ethnic 
identification for political ends signi-
ficantly drops in the national level ele-
ctions. This difference shows that large 
segments of minorities primarily identi-
fy as a 'voter', rather than as a 'member 
of an ethnically defined community': the 
small number of registered minority vo-
ters within the minority electoral unit is 
compounded by even lower numbers of 
ballots cast for the 'majority' candidates. 
8 For minorities settled in several munici-
palities, values are calculated as the simple 
average of single municipal values, regar-
dless of differences in population.
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Arguably 'it is uncomfortable for (regi-
stered minority voters) to vote for mino-
rity candidates – despite being registe-
red as minority, they need to ask for the 
special ballot'9, adding to peer-pressure 
at the polling station. The results could 
therefore suggest that all those groups 
too numerically small to meet the thres-
hold would be more likely to cast a 'civic' 
vote, pushing down the ratio of ethnic 
votes in comparison to the overall share 
of the ethnic population in the consti-
tuency.
Additionally, and given the negligible 
number of reserved seats for minority 
representatives as well as the absence 
of minority veto clauses, we take these 
findings as a counterfactual confirma-
tion of the effects that institutionalised 
ethnic voting has: casting a ballot for a 
candidate from one's own group wo-
uld likely result in the loss of the vote in 
national elections. This results from the 
electoral rules stipulating that represen-
tatives of all non-dominant groups run 
in the specially created, non-geograp-
hic electoral District XII that cumula-
tes the ballots for the seat reserved for 
all non-dominant groups and is shared 
across minority groups (Tatalović 2007; 
Omejec 2004; Baketa and Kovačić 2010; 
Petričušić 2002).
However, as we noted from the des-
criptive data in the table above, there is 
an observable difference in ethnic voting 
across different types of elections. We 
have data on parliamentary and minori-
ty council elections dating back to 2002 
which show uneven paths in the politi-
cal mobilisation of ethnic identity over 
the period for all non-dominant groups 
in conflict-affected regions of Croatia. 
As we have seen above, institutional in-
centives for ethnicity-based representa-
tion make ethno-political mobilisation 
9 Interview with Member of the Bosniak 
SDAH Party Presidency, Zagreb, 27 June 
2018.
sufficiently attractive for the electorate 
to avail themselves of their 'ethnic' vote 
at the expense of their 'civic' vote. Yet, it 
is also important to note that in minori-
ty council elections, members of mino-
rity communities are already limited in 
their choice of representatives for a fixed 
number of reserved seats within their 
own groups and regardless of their actu-
al turnout (Petričušić 2012). Our findin-
gs note the particularly remarkable rise 
of ethno-political mobilisation of the 
Hungarians, Roma and Bosniak groups 
over the said period of time in minority 
council elections, but only a sustainable 
upward mobilisation in the Hungarian 
community once we switch the focus 
to national elections. For example, an 
upward trend within the Hungarian ele-
ctorate is widely believed to be a result of 
the intensified intra-ethnic competition 
between two competing candidates, Ro-
bert Jankovics and Sandor Juhas, both 
of whom were running for the same mi-
nority seat in the national parliament in 
2015.
Consequently, we should assume that 
the choice of minority voters to cast the-
ir ballots in an ethnic vote at the natio-
nal elections, where they compete for re-
presentation with a 'generic' non-domi-
nant groups' representative, is divorced 
from their perception of the political 
empowerment of their community. This 
would merely result in their choice of a 
'civic' vote over their 'ethnic' ballot and a 
'waste' of their vote to an other non-do-
minant group.
Indeed, despite the relatively high le-
vels of identification there is only low 
level mobilisation in minority electi-
ons (77% and 44%, respectively) and 
low level identification reflects the high 
levels of mobilisation in parliamentary 
elections (62% and 52%, respectively). 
This shows a relatively high propensity 
for voting for one's own 'ethnic' can-
didate to the state-level institutions, 
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despite the potentially discouraging 
factor of the necessary choice between 
civic and ethnic vote. However, levels 
of mobilisation are still relatively high 
in the state level elections considering 
the fact that by voting ethnically, mi-
nority members are 'wasting' their ci-
vic vote. This indicates a relatively high 
(or at least some) degree of confidence 
of minorities in their state-level re-
presentatives: the upward trend in et-
hno-political mobilisation among the 
non-dominant Hungarians is suggesti-
ve of just that.
Figure 1. Levels of ethno-political identification across minorities in time
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Source: Authors' calculations based on official census and election data 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Levels of ethno-political mobilisation across minorities in time 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on official census and election data
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Minorities are particularly mobili-
sed in elections to municipal structu-
res where they can concurrently vote 
for 'non-ethnic' candidates. Similar to 
the degree of identification, the level of 
mobilisation is highest for the munici-
pal elections (78%), indicating that most 
of the voters who identify as minority 
also do use their exclusive 'ethnic' vote 
to elect the representative of their eth-
nic community in elections where they 
are likely to know the candidate's policy 
content, and their identity. At the same 
time, levels of ethno-political mobilisa-
Figure 2. Levels of ethno-political mobilisation across minorities in time
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Table 1. Non-dominant minorities in post-conflict areas of Croatia covered in this study 
Source: Authors' calculations based on official census and election data
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tion are clearly lowest in the elections 
to local minority institutions, which de-
monstrates that citizens have only scant 
interest and weak trust in the effective-
ness of these bodies as political repre-
sentative organs. In the context of po-
litical competition where voters assess 
politicised identities rather than politi-
cal content, as in municipal elections or 
in minority elections, there are arguably 
tangible pay-offs for ethnic identificati-
on for casting an 'ethnic' vote instead. 
For Bosniaks, 'The Islamic community 
has become a "grounding" structure; it is 
the centre of [their] cultural and politi-
cal life.'10 Overall, the findings indicate 
that minority voters are the most mobi-
lised at the municipal level of governan-
ce, significantly less for the state level 
institutions, and the least for their own 
minority institutions.
We have looked at the levels of eth-
no-political identification and mobi-
lisation and would like to explore how 
non-dominant minority groups fair in 
municipal level elections, where they 
mobilise primarily along ethnic lines. 
While we have observed the gradual 
decline of ethno-political mobilisation 
in parliamentary and minority elections 
for all the minorities above, there are 
significant differences among non-do-
minant groups' mobilisation in minority 
elections: these are elected separately in 
special minority elections in areas with 
designated demographic thresholds, 
with participation criteria set signifi-
cantly lower than for representation in 
legislature and executive institutions.11 
10 Interview with a Bosniak Religious Repre-
sentative, Cetingrad, 10 June 2015.
11 Even tiny municipal or regional communi-
ties counting at least 100 people can elect 
'their ethnic' representative directly. Those 
communities accounting for more than 
1.5% or 200 people (500 at the regional 
level) can then elect their special minority 
council consisting of 10 to 25 members 
(Petričušić 2011). 
Across the board, we find similar gro-
up-based patterns of ethno-political 
mobilisation across all non-dominant 
minorities. For most groups, the recor-
ded level of mobilisation of single mu-
nicipal communities is relatively similar 
regardless of the population share of the 
community. This suggests that the level 
of ethno-political mobilisation remains 
stable, reflecting ethnic groups' pattern 
of political mobilisation over time. Im-
portantly, we can clearly see from the 
longitudinal data that there is generally 
no link between the relative or absolu-
te population of minority communities 
and the level of their ethno-political 
mobilisation.
Different minorities reside in separate 
electoral units, which vividly illustrates 
the much less stable levels of ethno-poli-
tical mobilisation at this level of politics 
with significant differences between 'old' 
(Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ruthe-
nians) and 'new' minorities (Roma, Bo-
sniaks). The 'old' minorities experience 
stable and high levels of ethno-political 
identification, yet show fluctuating mo-
bilisation over time for municipal and 
minority elections. For the most part, 
the levels of ethno-political mobilisati-
on in 'new' minorities have fluctuated 
greatly: while the Bosniak minority re-
corded both rapid ups and downs, the 
Roma show stable and fast growth of 
their ethno-political participation. This 
is also reflected in these groups' co-
operation across Croatia: as one of our 
interviewees claims, 'Bosniaks who do 
not cast their ballot within the minori-
ty unit mainly vote for the option "left 
of centre" [SDP], and in Istria (an area 
with a strong regional identity), perhaps 
also for the Istrian Democratic Assem-
bly (IDS), a regional party.'12 At the same 
time, 'Local Bosniaks in Topusko used to 
12 Interview with an Elected Municipal 
Representative of the Bosniak Community, 
Cetingrad, 10 June 2015.
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be close to the local HDZ, and some of 
them also served in the Croatian army 
during the war. After the recent breakup 
of the local HDZ, it remains to be seen 
who the Bosniaks will align with.'13
Intergroup Differences in 
Political Participation
We have noted significant differences 
in the levels of single groups' mobilisa-
tion in municipal elections. Three gro-
ups should be noted separately here: 
the Hungarians because they exhibited 
a virtually full level of ethno-political 
mobilisation; the Roma because of their 
most rapid ethno-political mobilisation; 
and the Bosniaks due to the significant 
fluctuations in their mobilisation le-
vels. If anything, these dynamics point 
to a gradual normalisation of political 
competition at national level. Overall, 
however, group-specific settlement and 
participation patterns help us identify 
the different political participation stra-
tegies at the group level. For example, 
the Roma living in clusters tend to field 
more 'ethnic' candidates, whilst with 
the Bosniaks, the group most dispersed 
across Croatia and well integrated into 
the political environment, 'it is difficult 
[…] to mobilise politically on an ethnic 
basis alone.'14 Bosniaks and Albanians 
are present in urban settings throughout 
Croatia, but their numbers are not per-
ceived to be sufficient enough to impact 
municipal political dynamics. Croatia's 
Bosniaks, for example, are perceived to 
be 'too integrated', as demonstrated by 
their political representative in an inter-
view:
'There is a thin line between inte-
gration and assimilation, which is a 
serious threat for Croatian Bosniaks. 
13 Interview with a Local Elected Bosniak 
Re pre sentative, Topusko, 9 June 2015.
14 Interview with Advisor to the Minority 
Deputy in Croatian Parliament, Zagreb, 27 
June 2018.
First, the language is lost, then nati-
onal identity, and finally the religion 
too. Bosniaks will start to attend a 
church instead of a mosque and they 
will become ethnic Croats.'15
This on-going process of ethno-poli-
tical consolidation is also clearly visible 
from the demographic data for the peri-
od of 2001-2011: while 'old' minorities 
experience demographic decline, there 
is a clear upward trend in 'new' mino-
rities (Table 3). These census figures 
are also reflected in numbers of mino-
rity voters registering on ethnic rolls 
for parliamentary elections since 2003, 
showing a clear rise for all non-domi-
nant minorities, yet much more rapidly 
in electoral units that include 'new' mi-
norities.
The significantly higher levels of eth-
no-political mobilisation are confirmed 
for the Hungarian minority at the level 
of single municipal communities across 
all types of elections. On the contrary, 
we see significant discrepancies between 
the level of mobilisation of Czechs for 
municipal (73%), state-level (45%) and 
minority (17%) elections. A similar 
trend was recorded for Ruthenians, who 
show virtually full ethnic mobilisation 
(94%) when voting for their represen-
tatives to the municipal administration 
yet only limited interest in ethnic voting 
in minority (42%) and parliamentary 
elections (39%). The cases of these two 
groups fielding the majority in their ele-
ctoral districts clearly suggests that the 
level of ethno-political mobilisation is 
determined not by the overall group-le-
vel mobilisation but by the opportunity 
to vote-in a co-ethnic in municipal ele-
ctions as anticipated.
Generally, the level of ethno-political 
mobilisation and the difference between 
15 Interview with Member of the Bosniak 
SDAH Party Presidency, Zagreb, 27 June 
2018.
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'old' and 'new' minorities is not so much 
determined by the group level mobi-
lisation, but by the potential impact of 
political representation of ethnic mi-
norities at the level of municipal admi-
nistrations. 'Old' minorities generally 
show more stable and higher levels of 
mobilisation, which indicates their con-
solidated ethno-political identity in the 
context of prevalent intergroup compe-
tition between the Serbs and the Croats 
(especially in Eastern and Western Sla-
vonia). On the contrary, 'new' minori-
ties show fluctuating yet rising levels of 
ethno-political mobilisation, which sug-
gests potential competition between di-
fferent minorities in municipal electoral 
districts or an on-going process of their 
ethno-political consolidation alongside 
the dominant Croats.
We observe that despite incentives to 
foreground ethnic identity for purposes 
of political representation, ethnic diffe-
rences are being 'crowded out' by civic 
considerations and this is additionally 
complicated if the putative 'ethnic ho-
meland' is in close proximity: 'Bosniaks 
living close to the border see Bosnia as 
their "other" homeland: … Bosnia is clo-
se enough, yet it is different for Bosniaks 
living dispersed [or] in Zagreb.'16
It is widely believed that representati-
on of the Bosniak community is due to a 
lack of intra-ethnic cohesion rather than 
political competition within the group: 
only the '(ethno-)national minority' of 
Bosniaks is represented, while the (eth-
no-)religious category 'Muslim' is neit-
her recognized as minority, nor guaran-
teed political representation. Whilst,
'the division between Bosniaks 
and Muslims is not based on any real 
difference in identity … (implying 
that) only Bosniaks are legally reco-
gnized as minority, while Muslims 
16 Interview with a Bosniak Religious Repre-
sentative, Cetingrad, 10 June 2015.
are subsumed to be a part of "others". 
This distinction emerged during the 
war: those who were on Abdić's side 
(i.e. neutral and later pro-Serb during 
the conflict), tend to self-declare as 
Muslims, while those who suppor-
ted the Bosnian army identify as Bo-
sniaks.'17
Additionally, as the religious, political 
and cultural status of ethnic communi-
ties loses salience at the municipal level, 
voters express their primary concern 
with social and economic issues, which 
can be better communicated in munici-
pal level elections. Alongside other mi-
norities,
'Bosniaks are missing any econo-
mic perspective. It is not in the inte-
rest of the state to have Bosniaks li-
ving in the Kordun region, so the sta-
te does not offer them support and, 
at times, discriminates against them. 
If they were to receive (financial) su-
pport, there would be more Bosniaks 
coming to the area and they would 
reshape the (ethnic make-up of the) 
area (devastated and depopulated by 
war).'18
'It was all right for the (Croat) state 
and even in the interest of some par-
ties when the Serbs, the Hungarians 
and the Roma were fleeing after the 
re-integration (of Eastern Slavonia). 
They only realized today, when all 
are gone, that it devastated the whole 
region. General depopulation of the 
area eventually improved the eco-
nomic position of minorities. While 
a Croat rejects a job offer, a Serb, a 
Hungarian or a Roma accepts it even 
for a lower wage'.19
17 Interview with a Bosniak Religious Repre-
sentative, Cetingrad, 10 June 2015.
18 Interview with an Elected Municipal 
Representative of the Bosniak Community, 
Cetingrad, 10 June 2015.
19 Interview with an Elected Minority Muni-
cipal Representative, Darda, 24 April 2017.
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'The problem for Bosniak minori-
ty political representatives is that the 
former parliamentary deputy (Šemso 
Tanković, standing for SDAH, in of-
fice 2003-2011) did nothing for the 
community during his two manda-
tes: he did not care about the average 
Bosniak and his everyday problems. 
It was similar then with his succe-
ssor, Nedžad Hodžić, from the rival 
BDS party. This resulted in a situati-
on where the Bosniaks do not have a 
deputy while the Albanians, with half 
of the electorate, have succeeded in 
electing their candidate.'20
The diversity of interests of Croatia's 
non-dominant communities poses a 
challenge to their political representa-
tion. Although Romani representatives 
applaud the majority for extending equ-
al rights to minorities: 'Inter-ethnic re-
lations in Croatia have been resolved, as 
it is clear who the majority is, and who 
the minority. No group poses a risk to 
another community… Here, in Croatia, 
the majority granted the rights to mino-
rities,'21 there persist some noteworthy 
group-specific phenomena in ethno-po-
litical identification for the Roma, a 
community with the most pronounced 
rise of participation in all election types.
In 2007, the winning Roma candida-
te, Nazif Memedi, secured only a slight 
majority of 37 votes ahead of Nada Bajić, 
the second Roma candidate, and about 
100 votes more than a German candida-
te who landed in the third place. It is no-
teworthy that as a result of such a wide 
dispersion of votes, only 351 votes were 
sufficient for the Romani candidate to 
be elected in 2007. In later elections, the 
Romani community fielded more can-
20 Interview with a Member of the Bosniak 
SDAH Party Presidency, Zagreb, 27 June 
2018.
21 Interview with an Advisor to the Minority 
Deputy in Croatian Parliament, Zagreb, 27 
June 2018.
didates, yet Veljko Kajtazi dominated 
the electoral race in 2011 and came first 
ahead of the second Romani candidate, 
albeit with only 24 votes. Kajtazi conso-
lidated his lead in the 2015 elections by 
winning 41% of the vote over 17% of the 
second-running Romani candidate, and 
again in 2016 by 53% compared to 30% 
of the second-running candidate from 
the German community. Veljko Kajtazi 
has developed a clear political profile 
for this heterogeneous group around 
the issues of their weak socio-economic 
status and racialised representation in 
public by reaching out to Romani orga-
nizations of all (sub-)groups and repre-
senting all of Croatia's regions. Ensuring 
this broad appeal to the entire Romani 
community, Kajtazi was able to repea-
tedly win the elections, over the years 
becoming 'a dominant figure in the 
Romani politics'.22 As one of our inter-
viewees comments,
(Today), it is easy to exploit the 
Roma communities politically since 
they vote homogenously. Their local 
communities are internally cohe-
sive, if one votes for a single party, 
everyone will vote for it. As they live 
compactly, they are easily mobilised. 
[And, as the] Roma generally do not 
have political preferences, their so-
cio-economic situation determines 
their political behaviour.23
A similar spill-over effect was witnes-
sed with the Hungarian minority, which 
shows the highest level of ethno-political 
identification both across all elections 
and over time, with significantly higher 
values in parliamentary elections, where 
it has a reserved single seat of its own.
22 Interview with an Advisor to the Minority 
Deputy in Croatian Parliament, Zagreb, 27 
June 2018.
23 Interview with an Advisor to the Minority 
Deputy in Croatian Parliament, Zagreb, 27 
June 2018. 
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Discussion
We have explored the varying dynamics 
in electoral behaviour of non-dominant 
ethnic communities to ascertain the 
effects of ethno-political mobilisation by 
the dominant groups in the post-confli-
ct regions of Croatia. First, we focused 
on their levels of identification versus 
mobilisation in the electoral process; 
second, we discussed how levels of their 
ethno-political mobilisation vary accor-
ding to the type of election; and finally, 
we were able to establish the differen-
ce between the various non-dominant 
groups' levels of mobilisation that result 
from their opportunity to access and 
avail themselves of political opportunity 
structures in municipal level elections. 
While the levels of mobilisation are cle-
arly the highest in municipal elections 
and relatively high for state-level ele-
ctions, values for minority elections are 
rather low, indicating only weak interest 
in this type of ethnic representation. We 
can thus establish that, despite institu-
tional incentives to foreground ethnic 
identity to access reserved seats in the 
national elections as well as during the 
election of minority councils, politicking 
is best viewed through an ethnic prism 
only in municipal elections, i.e. where 
non-dominant minorities are de facto 
pluralities in their electoral districts.
While the paper offers an early stage 
exploration of the impact of institutio-
nal incentives for the ethnicised politi-
cal representation on the mobilisation 
of non-dominant groups, we believe 
that there are several further avenues for 
investigation to be tested here. First and 
foremost, reserved seats for political re-
presentatives of non-dominant groups' 
should encourage the formation of clo-
sed intra-ethnic lists for groups with ac-
cess to a single ethnic reserved seat. The-
oretically, this would result in cross-eth-
nic electoral coalitions between groups 
guaranteed reserved seats to share with 
other minorities in the national parlia-
ment, as well as with those who can cro-
ss the necessary threshold. As we have 
discussed in the latter part of the paper, 
there is some evidence that this happens 
in Croatia in relation to non-dominant 
groups that can present a clear front as 
a distinct, recognised ethnic community 
with guaranteed seats. However, where 
ethnic consolidation of the group is in-
complete, as with the Bosniaks, there is 
ample space for politicking on the issue 
basis within the group.
At the same time, we have found se-
cond-hand evidence of political cliente-
lism among the non-dominant groups 
in Croatia: the high levels of symbolic 
and practical value of political represen-
tation from the numerically negligible 
communities encourage ethnic voting 
'closer to home', i.e. in regional or mu-
nicipal elections. Participation in small 
scale political decision-making ushers 
in different electoral dynamics in these 
elections as compared to Sabor electi-
ons, as we clearly see in the case of the 
Roma. On the other side, we have seen 
that all those groups that are too nume-
rically small to cut the threshold are li-
kely to cast a 'civic' vote, pushing down 
the ratio of ethnic votes in comparison 
to the overall share of the ethnic popula-
tion in the constituency. The lack of visi-
ble representation of Czechs and Slovaks 
showcases this point.
Given the negligible number of reser-
ved seats for minority representatives 
and the absence of minority veto clau-
ses, the joint running of Ukrainian and 
Ruthenian candidates (together with 
another 10 minorities) corroborates the 
counterfactual effects of institutiona-
lised ethnic voting. These constituents 
systematically cast 'civic' ballots rather 
than 'ethnic' ones. Casting a ballot for a 
candidate standing in for the group but 
not being the group's representative, or 
being from outside one's own group is 
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akin to political competition where vo-
ters assess political content rather than 
politicised identities. Greater attention 
to political participation in electoral 
districts returning candidates whose 
declared ethnicity does not correspond 
to that of the majority of those electing 
them points to the gradual normalisa-
tion of political competition. Critically, 
this happens in spite of institutional in-
centives to ethnically identify for pur-
poses of political representation. Thus, 
further research is needed to assess the 
impact of ethnic competition between 
the dominant groups in national, mu-
nicipal as well as minority council ele-
ctions on non-dominant communities' 
preference to use their 'ethnic' over their 
'civic' vote when institutional incentives 
are in place to vote over identity rather 
than over policy issues.
Overall, however, we have laid the 
groundwork for understanding how 
non-dominant minorities respond poli-
tically to delicate situations of post con-
flict ethnicisation of political processes 
by the dominant groups, as well as by 
their apparent ethnic competitors nego-
tiating the Croat majority's nation-state 
building agenda.
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Deskriptivno predstavništvo i politička participacija: 
sudjelovanje nedominantnih manjina u izborima u Hrvatskoj
Sažetak niz etničkih sukoba na Zapadnom Balkanu devedesetih godina primarno 
je uključivao konstitutivne narode federativne jugoslavenske države: srbe, Hrvate, 
Bošnjake te, kasnije, Albance i makedonce. etničko nasilje zahvatilo je i brojčano 
male skupine na zemljopisnim područjima koja su bila pogođena sukobom domi-
nantnih etničkih skupina koje su de facto bile utemeljitelji država. Rad istražuje važ-
nost etničkog identiteta za političku participaciju nedominantnih skupina koje su 
bile pogođene etnopolitičkom dinamikom dominantnih skupina u postkonfliktnoj 
Hrvatskoj. Analiza političke mobilizacije nedominantnih skupina u regijama koje su 
prethodno bile pogođene sukobom pokazuje da njihova etničko-politička mobili-
zacija odražava trajnu važnost politike identiteta u kontekstu vrlo etniciziranih poli-
tičkih institucija koje jamče političko predstavljanje na nacionalnoj i lokalnoj razini.
Ključne riječi politička participacija, nedominantne manjine, lokalni izbori, post-
konfliktno društvo, Hrvatska
